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Unemployment Insurance, 
Unemployment Duration 
and Excess Supply of Labour 
Dennis R. MAKI 
This paper examines the effect of the unemployment 
insurance scheme on the duration of unemployment spells in 
Canada in the period 1953-1973. 
In his theory of frictional unemployment, Melvin Reder attempted 
to expain theoretically what unemployment rate would be associated 
with a given level of demand for goods and services. l For this purpose 
he constructed a model consisting of a worker search behaviour sub-
model, an employer search behaviour sub-model and some market 
identities relating the behavioural models. The worker behaviour 
portion of Reder's model states that in determining how «fussy» he 
will be about the characteristics of the job he will accept, the worker 
implicitly chooses an expected unemployment interval, given the 
probability of finding a job with given characteristics. It is further 
noted that « Excess labour supply exists only if the actual unemploy-
ment interval exceeds the expected unemployment interval».2 Thus an 
exogenously induced change in worker fussiness will, ceteris paribus, 
affect the average duration of unemployment and through this the 
unemployment rate, with no direct effect on the excess supply of 
labour. The greater the impact of thèse exogenously induced changes 
the less reliable the unemployment rate will be as an indicator of the 
excess supply of labour. 
It is clear from the literature relating to job search behaviour3 
that an important déterminant of fussiness is the cost of job search, 
the main component of which is foregone earnings. Foregone earnings 
will be lower the higher the degree 
of earnings replacement through 
unemployment insurance benefits 
and the more easily thèse benefits 
MAKI, D.R., Associate Professor 
Department of Economies and Com-
merce, Simon Fraser University, 
Burnaby, B.C. Canada. 
1
 REDER (1969). 
2
 Ibid. ,p. 9. 
3
 See for example STIGLER (1962), MCCALL (1970) and the papers by 
PHELPS, HOLT, ARCHIBALD, and MORTENSEN in PHELPS, et. al. (1970). 
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are available to the worker, so changes in the unemployment insurance 
scheme can, in theory, affect the duration of unemployment and the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and excess labour sypply. 
Whether this has occurred in Canada, and if so the magnitude of the 
effect, is basically an empirical question. 
There has been a small number of studies in other countries 
of the relationship between the duration of unemployment and char-
acteristics of the unemployment insurance scheme.4 Thèse studies 
in gênerai found only weak confirmation or no évidence in support 
of the hypothesis that the degree of earnings replacement was posi-
tively correlated with the duration of unemployment.5 There are three 
studies relating to Canada which investigate the relationship between 
unemployment insurance and the unemployment rate,6 ail of which 
suggest there has been a significant effect. It is the purpose of the 
current paper to investigate the relationship between unemployment 
insurance and the duration of unemployment in Canada. 
Aggregate data from the Labour Force Survey are used to dérive 
the duration measures. While data on the duration of spells for unem-
ployment insurance récipients would obviously be more appropriate, 
the duration catégories used in a potentially useful séries, claimants 
reporting to district offices by number of weeks on claim, were changed 
in 1955 and again in 1962 in a manner which does not allow con-
struction of a compatible séries by aggregation of catégories.7 It is 
thus impossible to dérive a long time séries on the average duration 
of unemployment experienced by unemployment insurance récipients. 
The Labour Force Survey data report the number of job seekers 
by four duration catégories.8 Thèse were converted into percentages 
of total job seekers to yield the variables: per cent seeking less than 
one month (PLT1), per cent seeking one to three months (Pl-3), per 
cent seeking four to six months (P4-6) and per cent seeking more than 
six months (PGT6). Persons on temporary layoff (non-seekers) were 
excluded from the analysis. Ail data used in this study are annual 
averages covering the period 1953-1973, inclusive. From the percen-
tages by duration category, an additional variable, average duration 
4
 See CHAPIN (1971), LININGER (1962) and MACKAY and REID (1972). 
5
 For a brief critique of thèse studies, see MUNTS and GARFINKEL (1974), 
pp. 32-35. 
6
 GREEN (1973), GRUBEL, MAKI and SAX (1975) and WALLACE (1974). 
7
 Statistics Canada (73-001). 
8
 Data from Statistics Canada (71-201, 1973, p. 162; and 1975, pp. 210-214). 
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in months (AVDUR) was constructed by assuming the mean duration 
for the first category as one-half month; for the second, two months; 
for the third, fîve months; and for the fourth, seven months.9 The 
resulting séries is shown in Table 1. 
TABLE I 
Average Duration of Unemployment for Job Seekers, 
Canada, 1953-1973. 
Year Months Year Months Year Months 
1953 2.27 i960 2.90 1967 2.50 
1954 2.69 1961 3.24 1968 2.74 
1955 2.80 1962 3.06 1969 2.88 
1956 2.43 1963 2.97 1970 3.02 
1957 2.30 1964 2.81 1971 3.36 
1958 3.01 1965 2.69 1972 3.21 
1959 2.99 
See text. 
1966 2.48 1973 3.07 
Source: 
It is apparent from Table 1 that average duration exhibits a 
cyclical pattern, with peaks in the recession years 1958 and 1961 
and troughs in the boom years 1956 and 1966. This is consistent with 
the theory, which would suggest that given a level of fussiness average 
duration will be high when the probability of finding a job with given 
characteristics is low. There also appears to be some lag effect, in 
that average duration increased from 1955 to 1956, and declined from 
1956 to 1957, while unemployment rates moved in the opposite direc-
tion. Similarly, average duration declined from 1959 to 1960 and in-
creased markedly from 1960 to 1961, while the unemployment rate in-
creased a full percentage point from 1959 to 1960 and only one-tenth 
of a percentage point from 1960 to 1961. The existence of a lag effect 
is not surprising, particularly given seasonal unemployment patterns 
in Canada. Many persons who suffer long duration spells of unemploy-
ment in a given calendar year became unemployed near the end of 
the previous year. 
Finally, there is some évidence average duration in the 1970's 
may be higher than historical patterns would predict. Granted unem-
ployment rates in the 1970's were consistently above the average for 
the twenty-one year period considered, the unemployment rate in 1971 
9
 Reestimating assuming the average duration for the open-ended category 
was eight months instead of seven did not change the results qualitatively, though 
there were marginal changes in coefficient magnitudes. 
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was lower than the rates in 1958, 1960 and 1961, while average dura-
tion was higher. Similar comparisons for other years in the 1970's 
disclose a slight but perceptible upward shift in the duration séries. 
Thèse observations suggest that, following Chapin (1971), one 
should regress average duration on the unemployment rate to control 
for cyclical variations in the probability of finding a job with given 
characteristics, possibly including a lagged unemployment rate term 
as well. This procédure was not followed herein because it would 
confound the unemployment insurance effects. If unemployment 
insurance benefits increase fussiness and hence the duration of unem-
ployment, they will also increase unemployment rates. Hence the 
unemployment rate term, if included in the estimating équation, would 
pick up part of the unemployment insurance effect. What is desired 
is a cyclical proxy which will control for variations in the probability 
of finding a job without simultaneously including supply side effects 
from the unemployment insurance scheme. 
Proxy variables which corne to mind are gros s national product, 
indexes of real domestic product or industrial production, and capacity 
utilization indexes. The first three variables listed could be used in 
the form of year-over-year percentage changes, ratios of actual to 
trend, or ratios of actual to potential. The concept of the ratio of 
actual to trend10 can be viewed as representing the ratio of actual to 
potential, using a naive interprétation of potential resting on a constant 
growth rate. As pointed out by the U.S. Couneil of Economie Ad-
visers, however, «potential does not grow year by year at a constant 
rate».11 Unfortunately, there is no gênerai agreement on how one 
should estimate potential,12 and there is no «officiai» séries for Canada 
which covers the period of interest.13 The Economie Couneil of 
Canada does présent (graphically) a potential output séries covering 
a long time period,14 but this is not useful for current purposes since 
it is calculated by assuming a constant unemployment rate. Since 
the central thesis herein is that the unemployment rate at full employ-
ment may hâve changed over time, use of the ECC séries on poten-
tial would be tantamount to assuming away the question to be investigated. 
10
 FELDSTEIN (1973) regressed the unemployment rate on the ratio to trend of 
the index of industrial production. 
11
 Couneil of Economie Advisers (1974, p. 65). 
12
 See PHILLIPS (1963) for a discussion of alternative approaches. 
13
 Canada Department of Finance (1975, pp. 29-31) reports measures of GNP 
gap for 1973 and 1974 by quarters. 
14
 Economie Couneil of Canada (1971, pp. 19-25). 
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Finally, the capacity utilization séries published by the Depart-
ment of Industry, Trade and Commerce15 is unavailable for years 
prior to 1961. Hence the only cyclical proxies investigated in this 
study were of the year-over-year percentage change variety, with 
the final estimations based on use of the percentage change in constant 
dollar gross national product (PCGNP) and the same variable lagged 
one year (PCGNP-1).16 It was expected that both variables would 
be negatively related to average duration. 
Two variables were introduced to account for the effects of the 
unemployment insurance scheme on fussiness, and hence on duration. 
The first of thèse is the ratio of average weekly unemployment in-
surance benfits paid17 to average weekly wages and salaries18 (UCB/ 
AWW), introduced to account for the degree of earnings replacement. 
Ideally, the denominator of this ratio should be «average weekly 
wages and salaries available to the insured unemployed», measured 
net of income and payroll taxes and adjusted upward to include the 
value of fringe benefits. The data to make the adjustments suggested 
by this observation are unavailable.19 The second unemployment 
insurance variable introduced is the percentage of new and renewal 
claims for benefits which are ruled inéligible (DENIALS).20 As the 
degree of earnings replacement increases, fussiness increases, but 
there are limits to the degree of fussiness allowable set by law and 
administrative discrétion. The extent to which thèse limits become 
operational is assumed to be reflected in the déniai rate. It was there-
fore hypothesized that average duration would be associated positively 
with UCB/AWW and negatively with DENIALS. In the course of 
estimation, it became apparent that DENIALS was collinear with 
PCGNP. Hence DENIALS was regressed on PCGNP and the residuals 
from this équation, denoted INEL, were used in place of DENIALS. 
This procédure produces a coefficient and associated t value for INEL 
which are the same as would obtain if DENIALS were used in unad-
justed form, but the t value of PCGNP is improved. 
There are a number of structural factors which could be as-
sociated with the duration of unemployment, most of them difficult 
15
 See Canada Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (1974). 
,6
 Data from Statistics Canada (11-003, p. 14) and (11-505, p. 16). 
17
 Data from Statistics Canada (73-001, December 1973, p. 25). 
18
 Data from Statistics Canada (11-003, p. 16) and (11-505, p. 58). 
19
 The problems introduced by the fact that unemployment benefits became 
subject to income tax in 1972 are discussed below. 
20
 Data from Statistics Canada (73-001). 
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to model empirically. The only factors in this category which were 
investigated in this paper were the âge and sex composition of the 
unemployed. Four variables were introduced, in various combinations. 
Thèse were females as per cent of the unemployed (PFEM), persons 
aged 14 — 24 years as per cent of the unemployed (P14-24), maies 
aged 25 — 54 years as per cent of the unemployed (PAM) and as 
per cent of the maie unemployed (PAM/M).21 The prime âge maie 
variables were consistently insignificant. Both PFEM and P14-24 
proved strongly and positively related to average duration, which 
was the expected sign for P14-24 but not for PFEM.2 2 Further, P14-24 
and PFEM are strongly intercorrelated (r = .97). Hence PI4-24 was 
retained, and is the only characteristics variable included in the resuits 
reported in Table 2. 
Unemployment insurance benefits became subject to income tax 
for the first time in 1972. Thus the last two observations in the UCB/ 
AWW séries are potentially biased to an unknown degree. An 
attempt was made to correct for this by assuming that the average 
tax rate on benefits was 20 per cent in thèse two years, resulting in 
équation 1) in Table 2; 10 per cent, resulting in équation la); and 
zéro, resulting in équation lb). It may be noted that both the R2 
and the t value of UCB/AWW increase as higher tax rates are as-
sumed. While the appropriate tax rate is unknown, ensuing discussion 
will be based on the assumed 20 per cent rate (équation 1), and équa-
tions 2) through 5) are estimated assuming a 20 per cent tax rate on 
benefits in 1972 and 1973.23 
The coefficients in ail of the average duration équations possess 
the hypothesized signs and are, with the exception of the coefficients 
for PCGNP, significant at the .05 level using a one-tailed test. From 
équation 1), the elasticity of average duration with respect to UCB/ 
AWW is 0.47, and with respect to DENIALS -0.20, both measured 
at the point of means. Since the two unemployment insurance va-
21
 Data from Statistics Canada (71-201, 1973, p. 156; and 1975, pp. 172, 174, 
193 and 197). 
22
 OSTRY and ZAIDI (1972, pp. 140-141) report on the basis of 1968 data that 
persons aged 14 — 24 years are more prone to long term unemployment than other 
âge groups, and maies expérience longer average duration than females. 
23
 FELDSTEIN (1974) estimâtes that in the United States in 1970, over half of 
total unemployment compensation paid went to families whose income, exclusive of 
unemployment compensation, was in excess of $10,000 per year. While similar data 
are unavailable for Canada, thèse figures suggest the average tax rate could be as 
high as 20 per cent. 
TABLE 2 
Régression Results, Canada, 1953-1973. 
Independent Variables 
Equation Dépendent Intercept UCBIAWW INEL PCGNP PCGNP-1 P14-24 
Number Variable 
0.369 4.521 -0.024 -0.017 -0.070 0.041 
1). AVDUR (0.50) (2.59) (-2.14) (-1.03) (-4.20) (3.89) 
0.909 3.365 -0.024 -0.020 -0.070 0.035 
la). AVDUR (1.58) (2.56) (-2.17) (-1.16) (-4.22) (3.49) 
1.253 2.595 -0.024 -0.021 -0.070 0.032 
lb). AVDUR (2.52) (2.49) (-2.14) (-1.22) (-4.22) (3.16) 
63.065 -76.369 0.349 0.419 1.025 -0.498 
2). PLT1 (6.48) (-3.32) (2.38) (1.87) (4.70) (-3.62) 
50.595 -12.748 0.105 -0.063 0.273 -0.238 
3). Pl-3 (8.48) (-0.90) (1.17) (-0.45) (2.04) (-2.82) 
3.582 52.219 -0.133 -0.310 -0.535 0.107 
4). P4-6 (0.64) (3.91) (-1.57) (-2.38) (-4.23) (1.35) 
-15.660 36.144 -0.289 -0.037 -0.764 0.595 
5). PGT6 (-1.60) (1.56) (-1.95) (-0.17) (-3.47) (4.29) 
Notes: t values shown in parenthèses. 
Equation la) estimated assuming average tax rate on benefits in 1972 and 
1973 was 10 per cent. Equation lb) assumes a zéro tax rate, and other 
équations assume a 20 per cent tax rate. 
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riables tend to be offsetting in their effect on average duration, it 
is interesting to ask what the effect of the 1971 changes in the Unem-
ployment Insurance Act was on duration. Multiplying the différences 
between the 1953-1970 average values of UCB/AWW and INEL and 
their 1972-1973 average values by the respective coefficients and 
summing the products yields 0.01 months. That is, équation 1) suggests 
the 1971 revisions in the Act increased average duration of unem-
ployment by a negligible amount. Equations la) and lb) predict larger 
increases, .09 months and .13 months, respectively. It should be 
stressed that this is an extremely tentative estimate, in that the coef-
ficient of UCB/AWW is very sensitive to the tax rate assumed, and 
the true value of the rate is unknown. 
Equations 2) through 5) were estimated in an attempt to analyze 
in greater détail the effects of the unemployment insurance variables 
on the structure of unemployment duration. Since the dépendent 
variables in thèse four équations are not independent of each other 
(they must sum to 100.0), the pattern of signs must differ among 
équations, e.g. if UCB/AWW is positively associated with long dura-
tion, it must be negatively associated with short duration. 
The results conform to expectations, in that the signs of coef-
ficients differ between the first two duration category équations and 
the last two. Concentrating attention on the unemployment insurance 
variables, they are both significant at the .05 level in the PLT1 équa-
tion, only UCB/AWW is significant in the P4-6 équation, only INEL 
is significant in the PGT6 équation, and neither is significant in the 
Pl-3 équation. Since Pl-3 contains the mean duration for most of the 
years considered, the non-significance in this équation of many of 
the variables chosen to explain average duration is not surprising. 
Note also that the coefficient of UCB/AWW déclines from équation 
4) to équation 5). Thus the results suggest that the effect of an increase 
in the benefit-wage ratio is to decrease the percentage of spells of 
unemployment falling in the less than one month duration category, 
and to increase the percentage falling in the four to six months ca-
tegory, with no significant effect on other catégories. 
The lack of significance for the benefit-wage ratio in the PGT6 
équation may be an indication that persons in this category suffer 
from genuine inability to obtain a job, not fussiness. This would be 
consistent with Holt's declining aspirations model.24 In addition, 
24
 HOLT(1970), p. 63). 
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benefit exhaustion may contribute to non-signifïcance of the benefit-
wage ratio in équation 5). 
Changes in the déniai rate appear to hâve their greatest influence 
on the lowest duration category. A one percentage point increase 
in the déniai rate increases the percentage of job seekers in the less 
than one month category by about three-tenths of a percentage point, 
ceteris paribus. 
In summary, it appears that characteristics of the unemploy-
ment insurance scheme hâve affected the duration of unemployment 
in Canada, but since the two characteristics chosen for analysis in 
this paper hâve offsetting effects, it appears the net effect may be 
small. Given the crudeness of the data utilized, it is unwarranted 
to generalize further. 
No hard policy implications can be drawn from thèse results, 
in that although the évidence presented suggests that increases in 
unemployment benefits and decreases in the enforcement of eligibility 
rules increase fussiness and hence unemployment duration, no évi-
dence is available regarding whether this increased fussiness produces 
jobs with higher wage rates or better non-pecuniary characteristics 
as viewed by the worker. Hence it is an open question what the 
effect of unemployment insurance has been on labour market effi-
ciency. The magnitudes of the elasticities estimated in this paper do 
suggest that analysis of the effect on efficiency is warranted. 
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Assurance-chômage, durée au chômage 
et offre de travail 
Selon la théorie du chômage frictionnel de Reder, le taux de chômage associé 
à un niveau donné de la demande globale provient en partie de ce que les sans-travail 
font les «gueules fines» devant les postes qui leur sont offerts. Lorsqu'un travailleur 
se montre «difficile», il choisit de ce fait un entre-temps de chômage. Reder fait 
remarquer que « la surabondance d'offre de travail n'existe que dans la mesure où la 
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durée exacte de la période de chômage dépasse l'intervalle de chômage auquel le 
travailleur s'attendait». Donc, un changement d'attitude de la part d'un travailleur 
influencera, toutes choses étant égales, la durée moyenne du chômage et, par consé-
quent, le taux de chômage sans pour autant avoir d'effet direct sur la surabondance 
d'offre de travail. 
Les modifications dans le régime des prestations d'assurance-chômage, par 
leur effet sur les revenus perdus pendant la période de recherche d'un emploi, de-
vraient exercer une influence sur les exigences du sans-travail. Se demander si un tel 
effet s'est fait sentir au Canada est donc une question pratique. Aussi, le but de la 
présente étude est-il d'examiner le rapport entre la durée du chômage et les caracté-
ristiques du régime d'assurance-chômage par une analyse de régression des séries 
chronologiques annuelles pour la période de 1953 à 1973. 
Cinq variables dépendantes ont été utilisées, toutes tirées des statistiques offi-
cielles relatives à la main-d'œuvre, soit: le pourcentage des travailleurs à la recherche 
de travail pendant moins d'un mois (PMI), d'un à trois mois (Pl-3), de quatre à six 
mois (B4-6), plus de six mois (PP-6) et, finalement, la durée moyenne du temps de 
recherche (DMTR), cette dernière variable étant établie selon l'hypothèse que la durée 
moyenne était de quinze jours pour la première catégorie, de deux mois pour la seconde, 
de cinq mois pour la troisième et de sept mois pour la dernière. 
On a aussi utilisé cinq variables indépendantes, deux représentant les caractéris-
tiques du régime d'assurance-chômage. La première consistait dans le rapport entre 
les prestations hebdomadaires moyennes et les salaires hebdomadaires moyens (PHM/ 
SHM), ceci afin de tenir compte de la part du revenu que les prestations rempla-
çaient; la deuxième dans le pourcentage des réclamations nouvelles ou renouvelées 
déclarées inadmissibles (REFUS). Considérant que les prestations (PHM) sont devenues 
imposables à partir de 1972, leur montant fut diminué de 10 pour cent, et à la suite 
d'une réévaluation, d'un second 10 pour cent. On introduisit encore d'autres variables 
indépendantes: le pourcentage de changement du produit national brut en dollars cons-
tants (PCPNB), cette variable étant reculée d'un an de façon à tenir compte des 
effets cycliques. Il en fut de même pour le groupe d'âge 14-24 ans en tant que pour-
centage des chômeurs (P14-24) de manière à tenir compte des variations dans la struc-
ture des groupes d'âge. À cause de certains problèmes de multicollinéarité, on a subs-
titué aux REFUS dans l'évaluation une nouvelle variable (INEL) qu'on pourrait 
désigner comme quantité résiduaire de la régression sur le PCPNB. 
Les résultats de la régression indiquent que la durée moyenne de l'entre-temps 
de chômage dépend d'une manière significative à la fois de (PHM/SHM (positivement) 
et INEL (négativement). En outre, PHM/SHM affecte PMI (positivement) et P4-6 
(négativement). Dans les autres catégories, les coefficients de .05 n'ont pas de signi-
fication statistique appréciable. Prenant pour acquis que l'imposition de PHM en 1972 
et 1973 était de 20 pour cent (c'est-à-dire que 20 pour cent des sommes ainsi reçues 
retournaient à l'État), les résultats démontrent qu'il n'y avait guère d'écarts dans la 
durée moyenne de chômage dont les modifications à la Loi sur l'assurance-chômage 
de 1971 soient la cause. 
On ne peut tirer aucune conséquence politique ferme de ces résultats en ce 
qu'on ne trouve aucune preuve valable que l'accroissement des exigences des salariés 
conduit à des salaires plus élevés ou des conditions de travail non-monétaires meilleures. 
